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#1
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![]() Quote:
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#2
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#3
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![]() Uh yeah... no.
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Gentlemen! We're burning daylight! Riders up! -Bill Murray |
#4
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#5
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![]() Madison’s draft of what became the Fourth Amendment answered these charges by providing that the “rights of the people to be secured in their persons . . . from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause . . . or not particularly describing the places to be searched.” 1 Annals of Cong. 434–435 (1789). As ratified, the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause forbids a warrant to “issue” except “upon probable cause,” and requires that it be “particula[r]” (which is to say, individualized) to “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” And we have held that, even when a warrant is not constitutionally necessary, the Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition of “unreasonable” searches imports the same requirementof individualized suspicion. See Chandler v. Miller, 520
U. S. 305, 308 (1997). |
#6
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![]() So while the Court is correct to note (ante, at 8–9) thatthere are instances in which we have permitted searches without individualized suspicion, “[i]n none of these cases. . . did we indicate approval of a [search] whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminalwrongdoing.” Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 38 (2000). That limitation is crucial.
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