Why not just quote from the National Enquirer?
Nuclear treaties aren't worth the paper they are written on anyway. So we should be "embarassed" with delays to signing the STARt treaty?
Well here is some info on our 'friends', the Russians from a GAO report to Congress in 2003:
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03526t.pdf
Over the past decade, the United States has responded to increased
proliferation risks in Russia by
providing $6.4 billion for Departments of
Defense, Energy, and State programs in the former Soviet Union. The
United States has made important progress in three areas. First, the
Department of Defense helped destroy 463 Russian nuclear submarines,
long-range bombers, and strategic missiles to support Russia’s efforts to
meet treaty requirements. Second, the Department of Energy installed
security systems that helped protect 32 percent of Russia’s weapons usable
nuclear material. Third, the United States supplemented the income
of thousands of Russian weapons scientists so they would be less inclined
to sell their skills to countries of concern.
However, U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have
consistently faced two critical challenges: (1)
the Russian government has
not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs and (2) Russian
ministries have often denied U.S. officials access to key nuclear and
biological sites. Regarding program costs, Russia did not pay, for example,
its previously agreed-upon share of $275 million to design and build a
nuclear storage site at Mayak. As of January 2003, the United States plans
to spend $385 million for a scaled-down version of this site. Russia has
also failed to pay operation and maintenance costs for security equipment
the United States installed at sites with weapons-usable nuclear material.
As a result, DOE plans to spend an additional $171 million to ensure that
this equipment is properly maintained. Regarding access,
Russia will not
allow DOD and DOE the level of access they require to design security
improvements, verify their installation, and ensure their proper operation.
As a result, the agencies have been unable to help protect substantial
portions of Russia’s nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear
material. In addition, many Russian biological sites that store dangerous
biological pathogens remain off-limits to the United States.
Russia justifies
these access restrictions on the grounds that it is protecting its national
security interests.
Of course these were all provisions of another nuclear waepons treaty.